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DICTA

SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEEDINGS IN
ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS*
WILLIAM RANN NEWCOMB
of the Denver Bar

A layman might suggest as a subtitle for this article, "Back
'em up to the wall" or "How to pick their pockets legally." The
source of the legality of such conduct is to be found in Rule 69 of
the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure. It is important at the outset to explain this rule briefly together with its history. The rule
is divided into eight parts, subparagraphs "A" through "H". Those
parts are as follows:
A. Process to enforce a money judgment shall be a writ of
execution, unless the court directs otherwise.
B. Execution for costs may issue in like manner, as upon a
judgment.
C. Any person who is a judgment debtor after issuance of an
execution against property, may pay the sheriff the amount of the
debt and such payment will discharge the judgment.
D. Whenever execution may issue on a judgment, the judgment creditor shall be entitled to an order for the debtor to appear
before the court, or a master, at a specified time and place to answer
concerning his property. If a debtor resides outside the country,
the court may make just orders as to mileage and expenses. If it
appears to the court that there is danger of the debtor absconding
it may issue an order of arrest, bring him before the court, and
require a bond conditioned on his appearing at the time of the hearing and upon disposing of any of his property. If he does not post
such a bond, he may be committed to jail.
E. A debtor of the judgment debtor may be required to
appear and be questioned.
F. The court, or master, may order any property of the judgment debtor not exempt from execution in the hands of such debtor
or any other person, or due to the judgment debtor, to be applied
towards the satisfaction of the judgment. Violation of this order
is punishable by contempt. Nothing in the rule shall be construed to
prevent an action in the nature of a creditor's bill.
G. Witnesses may be required to appear and testify as at any
trial.
H. Depositions may be taken in the same manner of any
person upon order of court obtained ex parte.
The above rule is copied, to a great extent, from the former
Code of Civil Procedure. Only two significant changes were made
* This is in substance the discussion given by Mr. Newcomb at the first session of
the Denver Bar Association's institute on creditors' rights, January 24, 1950.
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in the rule: First, it no longer provides that execution must issue
and be returned nulla bona as a prerequisite to supplementary proceedings, and, secondly, the motion seeking such an order need not
be verified. It should also be noted that in turn the Code is "almost
a literal transcript of the provisions of the Code of California on
the same subjeot, and are similar to the provisions of the codes of
Wisconsin and New York."1
PURPOSE OF RULE

69

There are, it is believed, three fundamental objectives in the
use of Rule 69. Behind all of them, however, there lurks the haunting suspicion of counsel that the debtor has some property somewhere that could be applied to the judgment. If the defendant is
obviously judgment-proof, it is useless to invoke the rule. If it is
suspected he is not judgment-proof, a creditor's lawyer has three
things in mind in the use of Rule 69:
(1)
Discover his assets.
(2)
Have those assets applied on the judgment in a summary
fashion at the time of the hearing.
(3)
Discover facts concerning the debtor's past and present
financial condition and transactions as a basis for additional proceedings, such as a creditor's bill, or involuntary bankruptcy to recover a preference.
In view of these purposes, it is clear that counsel, before embarking upon the use of Rule 69, should have at least a general
understanding of the substantive law in the whole field of creditors'
rights. If he doesn't, he is not apt to ask the right questions to get
at the important facts. For example, if the debtor is a corporation,
counsel would want to know if there are any stockholders who have
not paid for their stock. He must know the Bulk Sales Act, the
laws on fraudulent conveyances, the various acts of bankruptcy,
and voidable preferences. It has been said that there are two rules
to follow: (1) Always follow-through on questioning to get the
complete story. (2) Make sure questions are founded upon the applicable substantive law.
It would he fruitless for anyone to attempt to discuss in detail
the exact questions which should be submitted to the debtor or to
the debtor's debtor. Suffice it to say that one may find an excellent
beginning point in the pamphlet of the Practicing Law Institute,
entitled, "Collecting Claims."
METHOD OF INVOKING RULE
Two papers have to be prepared by the lawyer invoking Rule
69 with regard to summoning the judgment debtor-the motion
and order. The motion need allege only two things, to-wit: Judgment has been entered and that execution may issue. The order,
'IHexter v. Clifford, 5 Colo. 168 (1879).
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which must be prepared by counsel in advance, should contain the
time and place for the appearance of the debtor. This order may
be directed to the clerk to issue a citation, which may then be served
by the sheriff on the debtor, or the order could be prepared in duplicate and provide in itself that a copy of the order may be served
upon the debtor in the same manner as a summons under Rule 4.
It is advisable in preparing the order to leave the time for the hearing blank so that the judge and his clerk may fill it in when it is
presented. This proceeding, of course, is ex parte.
ORDERS FOR PROPERTY TO BE APPLIED

In order to discuss this phase of the problem it is necessary
to indulge in several assumptions, namely: the judgment debtor has
been brought into court and questioned exhaustively as to his property; "his pocket has been picked" of any cash that he might have
had on his person and the court has ordered it paid into the registry
of the court to be applied on the judgment; and similar orders have
been procured with respect to any jewelry or other thing of value
he may have had on his person not exempt from execution, such as
wearing apparel. It further may be assumed that questioning has
developed certain fact situations:
(a) that the debtor has cash in his control.
(b) that the debtor has other intangible personal property.
(c)
that the debtor has real estate.
(d) that he has property located outside the state.
(e)
that he has money owing him by his debtors.
(a) Cash in Control of Debtor
Where it is learned that the debtor has cash either in a bank
account or in some place where he has access to it, is it necessary
to adjourn the hearing, deliver a writ of execution to the sheriff,
and attempt to race the debtor to the location of the cash? It is
not. The authorities are clear that the court may then and there
order the debtor to go get the money and either pay it to counsel,
to the sheriff, or to the clerk of the court. Conceivably, it may even
be possible for the court to order the defendant to make out a
check drawn on any bank account which he has admitted he has.
Some of the cases dealing with these fascinating possibilities are,
as follows:
Hosmer v. Mutual Reserve Ins. Co. 2 In this case the court

ordered that the defendant insurance company pay over $250.00
from its surplus to the plaintiff after a full hearing had been had
into the financial condition of the company. Incidentally, it was
argued in this case that since the company was a mutual fire insurance company, the other members had an equal right to the surplus,
but the court said: "Diligence justifies a preference."
2145 Kan. 381, 65 P. 2d 295 (1937).
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Medical Finance Ass'n v. Short.3 Upon examination the defendant disclosed that she had in her possession and under her
control a check in her favor in the sum of $47.50 as services rendered to a governmental agency, the Works Progress Administration. The lower court refused to order that she apply any portion
of this check to the judgment. The appellate department, however,
reversed, and said:
Although the intangible credit could not be reached by plaintiff in such a proceeding as this while it remained a mere debt due
from the government to defendant, it became available and amenable to control of the court when its status and character were
changed to the extent of its becoming tangible property in the
actual possession and control of defendant, i.e., when she received
the check. If necessary or expedient in securing the conversion of
the check into legal tender and the application of one-half thereof
toward saisfaction of the judgment, the court may appoint a receiver for that purpose.

Wilson v. Columbia Casualty Co. 4 In this case it appeared that
shortly after the judgment had been entered, the defendant, who
was in Ohio, sent $1250-00 to his brother in Washington, Pennsylvania. It was admitted that the brother held this fund in trust for
the defendant. The court, in a supplementary proceeding, found
as follows:
Said Addison R. Wilson (the defendant) owns and has the
absolute control and disposition of the sum of $1250.00 which he
wrongfully and fraudulently has sent out of the State of Ohio with
intent to prevent the same being applied on the judgment in the
foregoing action, and should be applied on said judgment, and said
application is therefore granted.

The court thereupon
sum to the sheriff to
refused to do so and
court. The Supreme
following language:

ordered the defendant to pay over the said
be applied on the judgment. The defendant
appealed from his sentence for contempt of
Court of Ohio affirmed the sentence, in the

Plaintiff in error urges that, since the money sought to be
reached was not in the physical possession of Addison R. Wilson,
the court was without jurisdiction to make any order respecting
the fund. This contention, however, is incorrect. The court of
common pleas could not make an order upon the brother in Washington, Pa., to pay the money upon the judgment, nor could it
attach or sequester the fund in Washington, Pa., but it could and
did order the defendant in Cleveland, Ohio, to take such action
that the fund in Pennsylvania could be applied to the satisfaction
of the judgment. The jurisdiction of the court over the defendant
was undoubted.
Obviously the direction from Wilson must be sent from Cleveland to Washington, Pa. When the fund is in the possession of the
brother in Pennsylvania, the brother in Ohio cannot physically
turn it over in Ohio; but the brother in Ohio can and must set in
'36 Cal. App. 2d 745, 92 P. 2d 961 (1939).
1118 Ohio St. 319, 160 N.E. 906 (1928).

DICTA
process the train of action which will result in the same being applied upon this judgment, and that the brother in Ohio, according
to this record, has not even begun to do.

(b) Intangible Personal Property of the Debtor
With respect to intangible personal property, the immediately
preceding case is important, and in addition, there is the case of
Iowa Methodist Hospital v. Long,5 in which it was disclosed upon
examination that the defendant had under his control a number of
Series "E" Government bonds. It was determined by the lower
court that some of them had been purchased directly from the
wages of the defendant and were therefore exempt under the
statutes of Iowa, which exempt wages, but that some of them had
not been so purchased. The court held:
It is therefore ordered that the defendant sell the balance of
the fourteen bonds heretofore not declared exempt to him, and pay
the proceeds into the office of the clerk of the municipal court by
noon of the 30th day of July, 1943.

On appeal, the Supreme Court held that none of the bonds were
exempt and that the order of the lower court should have applied
to all of them.
(c) Real Estate of the Debtor
With respect to real estate, the cases are not in accord.
In Walker v. Staley,6 the Colorado court said:
Sec. 270, supra (referring to the Code) does not contemplate
that real property may be sold under order of court made in a supplementary proceeding, even when title stands in the name of the
judgment debtor. In such case the judgment creditor may cause
execution to be levied upon the property; it requires no order of
court.

In this case, however, it appeared in the supplementary proceeding that title to the property was in the defendant's wife's
name, but more of that later. It should be noted, however, that
this case was decided before the Rules of Civil Procedure were
adopted. Since, under Rule 69, this proceeding may be instituted
without an execution being returned nulla bona, the reason for
Walker v. Staley, supra, no longer seems to apply. Consequently,
if the question were argued again it is possible that the Colorado
Supreme Court would follow the majority rule as stated below.
Cleverly v. District Court,7 seems to state the majority view
of this question. In this case, on a supplementary proceeding, the
lower court found that a piece of real estate standing in the names
of the defendants was not exempt as a homestead, directed the sheriff to proceed against the property and to apply the proceeds from
the sale thereof towards satisfaction of the judgment. The Supreme
Court affirmed, in these words:
1234 Ia. 843, 12 N.W. 2d 171, 150 A.L.R. 440 (1944).
689 Colo. 292, 1 P. 2d 924 (1931).
'85 Utah 440, 39 P. 2d 748 (1939).
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Every species of property is included in the term "any property," so that the order may be made applicable to any species of
property of a judgment debtor, including real property or an interest therein.

(d) Property of Debtor Outside the State
Where the questioning reveals that the judgment debtor owns
real estate or other tangible property in another state there is a
serious problem as to how far the Colorado court can go in subjecting that property to the Colorado judgment. There is a scarcity
of cases on this point, but what decisions there are seemed to be
summed up in 21 Am. Jur. 329, as follows:
A judgment debtor who has property in a foreign state may not
be compelled by proceedings supplementary to execution to go there,
get the property, and apply it on the judgment. However, it is
sometimes regarded as a proper practice to require the judgment
debtor to make an assignment of such property to the receiver.

The theory of such cases, of course, is that the order of the
court acts in personam, and jurisdiction over the property itself is
not necessary. In the case of intangible personal property located
outside of the state, the cases cited above and particuarly Wilson v.
Columbia Casualty Company, supra, state the general rule.
(e) Debtor of the Judgment Debtor
The next problem involves the situation where inquiry of the
judgment debtor reveals that property belonging to him is in the
name or hands of another person, or that someone owes him money.
It is clear that counsel cannot then and there procure an order directed to the third party, since he is not as yet a party to the proceeding. Walker v. Staley, supra. In this case, the lower court, upon
the questioning of the defendant alone, found that title to a piece
of real estate in the name of his wife really belonged to defendant.
The court appointed a receiver of the property and directed him to
take charge of it and sell it, pay the receiver's expenses,. the court
costs and the judgment. Mrs. Walker was never a party to the proceeding. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed, in these words:
It was beyond the jurisdiction
order. The court had no power to
session of the property and sell it
Walker her day in court. That she

-of the court to make such an
order the receiver to take poswithout first according to Mrs.
never had.

The court also said that the proper remedy was a creditor's suit.
Bond v. Bulgheroni,8 held that a creditor's bill was the proper
remedy where there were adverse claimants to the property involved. Brindjonc v. Brindjonc,9 took a somewhat different approach. In this case the proceedings developed that a third party
8215 Cal. 7, 8 P. 130 (1932).
996 Mont. 489, 31 P. 2d 725 (1934).
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held funds which the defendant claimed belonged to the defendant.
The court stated that no order could be made requiring the third
party to pay over the money to the plaintiff at that time. The
proper procedure was to continue the hearing and order the third
party in to determine whether he had any claim to the property
and, if he disclaimed any interest, the appropriate order could be
made.
PENALTIES FOR DISOBEYING ORDERS UNDER RULE

69

Under Rule 69(f) the court, or master, has ample authority
to punish any party or witness for contempt for disobeying any
proper order. It has also been held in Colorado in the case of
Handler v. Gordon,10 that where the judgment debtor in the supplementary proceeding committed perjury, and it was so established in the hearing itself, the court has the right summarily to
punish him for contempt without leaving the punishment to formal
criminal processes. The theory, of course, is that perjury causes an
obstruction of justice.
The case of the lying judgment debtor, however, presents
many very serious problems. Assuming that the debtor is prepared
to perjure himself concerning his assets, he has the questioner at
a psychological disadvantage from the beginning because he is
generally smart enough to know that the examiner doesn't know
all that he knows, or he would not have been summoned into court
to answer questions. Consequently, there is some slight incentive
to lie about the matters inquired into. Here the examiner must resort to all the techniques generally known to the trial lawyer as
to how to treat the perjuring witness. There is no one satisfactory
answer to it. The author's experience in such a case has been to
wish fervently that our humane laws had not abolished the debtor's
prison.
MISCELLANEOUS POINTS TO BE CONSIDERED UNDER THE RULE

(a) Interim period between service of the order on the debtor
to appearand the hearing. Isn't there the danger that the judgment
debtor will cover up his property during that period of time? In
other words, is one entitled to a restraining order? There is no
mention made of this in the rule, and the only Colorado case is
Rule v. Gumeer." In this case, the lower court included in its order
requiring the defendant to appear an order restraining him from
transferring any of his property, real or personal. The defendant
moved to vacate the restraining order, his motion was overruled,
and he appealed. The supreme court denied the appeal without
considering the merits on the ground that the order was not appealable. The moral seems to be: get the order ex parte to be safe. The
10 111 Colo. 234, 140 P. 2d 622 (1943).
11 12 Colo. 591 (1889).
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author has been able to find no cases from other jurisdictions; it
should be pointed out, however, that the New York Code specifically provides for it.
(b)
Interim period between time of hearing and levy, or
other action contemplated, such as a creditor's bill. It is clear that
a court has inherent authority to issue such a restraining order,
in view of the authority given to the court in the first place by Rule
69 (f) to require the debtor to apply his property to satisfaction of
the judgment.
(c) Documents may be required to be produced. Rule 69 (g)
provides for the subpoena of witnesses as upon the trial of any
civil action. It would seem possible, therefore, to cause a subpoena
duces tecum, under Rule 45(b), to be directed to the defendant
along with the order requiring him to appear, and get the necessary business records, etc. An interesting question in this case
would be the right to compel the production of retained copies of
income tax returns. Leonard v. Wargon,12 held that a judgment
debtor may be questioned concerning recent Federal income tax
returns filed by him, and he may be required by order of the court to
produce copies of such returns in the debtor's possession. The
court points out, of course, that the judgment creditor may not
compel the production of the originals of any federal agency or
employee. There is a conflict on this point, however, with regard to
discovery rules in the trial of a civil action.
(d) Does the discovery of assets through Rule 69 give a
judgment creditora priority? There is a distinct possibility of this.
The question is annotated for your further consideration in 92 A. L.
R. 1430, which states:
Although the question is largely one of statutory interpretation, the prevailing view is that a judgment creditor who institutes
supplementary proceedings, at some stage of the proceedings, acquires a lien upon the property disclosed thereby.

This may be of great importance where there are other judgment
creditors after the same assets. One of the cases cited by 92 A. L. R.
is Ex parte Roddey.13 There were three judgment creditors involved here. One of them instituted supplementary proceedings
which disclosed that the debtor had certain securities of the value
of about $1000 which had been hypothecated in New York to secure
an indebtedness of about $185. The lower court issued an order
directing the sheriff to levy upon this property. Pursuant to this
order, the holder of the securities forwarded them to a bank in
South Carolina. In the meantime, all three judgment creditors had
placed their writs of execution in the hands of the sheriff. He
took the three executions, levied on the securities, and sold them.
Then the dispute arose as to whether all three of the judgment
creditors should share pro rata in the balance of the sales price
255 N. Y. Supp. 2d 626 (1945).
1"171 So. Car. 489, 172 S.E. 866 (1934).
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after the payment of the debt for which they were pledged. The
Supreme Court of South Carolina granted a priority to the judgment creditor who had instituted the supplementary proceeding,
and said:
It is patent that supplementary proceedings are equitable in
their nature and designed to aid the enforcement of rights which
cannot be enforced by the legal process of execution. That being
so, it much follow that Judge Stoll (the lower court) had authority
to direct the payment of the proceeds of the sale of the debtor's
property to the judgment creditor whose diligence had discovered
the property of the judgment debtor and brought it into court.

In Hexter v. Clifford,1 4 it was recognized that supplementary
proceedings are analogous to creditors' bills. However, the case
holds that supplementary proceedings under the Code became an
exclusive remedy and that a creditors' bill could not be maintained
in any case where supplementary proceedings would lie. The theory
back of that case has certainly been changed by Rule 69, which
says: "Nothing in this Rule shall be construed to prevent an action
in the nature of a creditor's bill." Consequently, the matter is still
very much an open question in this state but is certainly an arguable possibility.
69
There are two glaring deficiencies in Rule 69 which the author
would recommend be changed in accordance with New York procedure: First, there is the problem which is mentioned briefly above
concerning the interim period between the time of service of the
order to appear and the time of the hearing itself. In New York
there is a specific provision which allows the court on an ex parte
application to include in its order to appear a blanket restraining
order enjoining the debtor (or the debtor of the judgment debtor,
as the case may be) from making any transfer, assignment or
other disposition of his property. This restraining order may be
continued from time to time during the pendency of the hearing.
Secondly, there is the problem of the wage earner debtor in
this state. Our present practice is to run a garnishment on his
wages. This is not only likely to disappoint the creditor so far as
results are concerned, but also, in many cases, results in a loss of
job or subterfuges where it appears that the garnishment is going to become a weekly or monthly problem. Such a result benefits
no one. The New York Code, however, provides that in such a
case the court, after a full hearing, may order the debtor to pay
over to the creditor, or into court, a certain sum of money out of
each pay check. The amount to be paid is fixed by the Code as to
that amount over and above the necessary living expenses of the
debtor and his family. This is certainly a much more sensible approach to the problem and one that could well be considered in this
state.
RECOMMENDED AMENDMENTS TO RULE

14 5

Colo. 168 (1879).

